Thread: Tank Whores

I myself could be classified under LBird whore, be it trans or attack but it sucks to spawn in to see some yuppie trying to take off only to put an undisclosed part of the helo into the deck/dirt followed by a nice little boom.

Originally Posted by Blakeman

Originally Posted by Atrovenator

A tank squad should only ever contain one tank, driver/gunner and no engi.

Tanks = Property of Battalion Command, SLs keep yer filthy grunt hands off!

I agree with you except on these two points. A grunt squad backed up by a tank on call is a great asset that can be positioned if the single squad is left to defend one point. AKA South Village on Kashan.

As the standoff distance of Armour is far greater than that of infantry, as is its vulnerable profile, it's not really cut out for operation with infantry. Unlike an APC which is designed for infantry transport and suppression of hostile infantry the MBT is clearly cut out for long ranged fire support. Suppose you have armour operating from within village, a 2 person crew supporting a 4 person section. MBTs are not cut out for urban combat and therefore are at a signifigant disadvantage if hostile infantry closes to the target area. The infantry section to which they are attached will then also be at a disadvantage being undermanned against a possible six person infantry assault. "But," you will no doubt say, "that's why the tank is there in the first place. The infantry should never be able to get close." Which would be true if the tank were positioned several hundred meters back in the hilltops. This is of course speaking specifically of Kashan. However, the compounded problem of placing a tank at south village is its immediate vulnerability there to enemy armour. MBTs benefit from mobility, durability and firepower. Removing any one of these aspects makes the asset vulnerable. The tank needs clear and concise communications between crew and the CO, and the infantry squad needs two more bodies on the flag. All you have by combining the two is a weakened tank and a weakened infantry presence.

I also believe that in some maps like Qin Ling the use of an engineer on board the tank is vital as both a machine gunner and repair person. Too many times have I seen tanks that needed repair be ignored by engineers who would walk right by them.

In my experience as a tank operator on Quinling, it is much more effective to have dedicated external repair support in the form of an engineer squad than to have a third mounted on the tank. A driver switching onto the .50 and staying down causes the tank's engine/powerplant to shut down enabling the tracking of hostile sound contacts. In the battleship hide-and-seek of tank warfare in PR (since modern militaries apparently lack UAV, GPS and intel satellite capabilities) this sound tracking is integral to getting the drop on unsuspecting hostile armour. At the same time, it's possible for this to be obtained by the driver/engineer dismounting, but the added vulnerability of being right outside the vehicle as opposed to ducked down in the turret is an unnecessary complication

The overall commander should have control yes, but squad leaders should be able to assist in their own part directing the local war. The commander does not have eyes everywhere so thus must rely on the local command to ascertain and relegate the situation as it happens.

One of the greatest problems of command is that of engagement level management. It is the commanders task to position his forces. It is the commanders task to define an area of engagement (though this is done in part, in coordination with an enemy commander) and may or may not be plausible (see: Fighting an Insurgency). This means that while the flow of the battle is dictated by the troops, its initiation must be conducted on the CO's terms. Armoured assets can be more precisely positioned by someone with the maximum amount of information than they ever can by by an SL who lacks knowledge of what is over the next ridgelines. I suppose in the above you're also making inferences about the perceived competence of the commander (in 'he does not have eyes everywhere.') In reality, units shouldn't be advancing without his approval, though they may certainly take the initiative to do so without his direction. Being in a position to take the 'village' point, is something that should be relayed by an SL to command. Who will then give a 'negative' or an 'affirmative' based on his knowledge of what is happening elsewhere. However, the decision to commit an armored asset to cover an infantry advance or to protect its flank, must be made by the commander as it is his responsibility through the course of the battle to be tracking the location of enemy armour/antiarmour capabilities. Contrary to popular belief, tanks should not be engaging each other at all costs (unless you favour the idea of a crushing defeat or mass armoured attrition on both sides) See: Al Kufrah. Rather, the tanks should be offering fire support and withdrawing/avoiding from engagement with hostile armour until such time as neutralization of the hostile armour target (through positioning of assets by the commander, be they spotter-teams, anti-armour teams or simply -more- tanks than the enemy has in a given area) is assured.

I do believe though that a 2 man sniper squad made up of a sniper and the socom kits can be devastating if used by a team that can keep out of sight and alive to accomplish their mission objectives.

That is if noobie McVasiliPwnzorz III hasn't already grabbed the sniper/marksman/specops kit 'cuz I kin kill a lot with dose kits'.
:5

Originally Posted by Atrovenator

Originally Posted by Blakeman

Originally Posted by Atrovenator

A tank squad should only ever contain one tank, driver/gunner and no engi.

Tanks = Property of Battalion Command, SLs keep yer filthy grunt hands off!

I agree with you except on these two points. A grunt squad backed up by a tank on call is a great asset that can be positioned if the single squad is left to defend one point. AKA South Village on Kashan.

As the standoff distance of Armour is far greater than that of infantry, as is its vulnerable profile, it's not really cut out for operation with infantry. Unlike an APC which is designed for infantry transport and suppression of hostile infantry the MBT is clearly cut out for long ranged fire support. Suppose you have armour operating from within village, a 2 person crew supporting a 4 person section. MBTs are not cut out for urban combat and therefore are at a signifigant disadvantage if hostile infantry closes to the target area. The infantry section to which they are attached will then also be at a disadvantage being undermanned against a possible six person infantry assault. "But," you will no doubt say, "that's why the tank is there in the first place. The infantry should never be able to get close." Which would be true if the tank were positioned several hundred meters back in the hilltops. This is of course speaking specifically of Kashan. However, the compounded problem of placing a tank at south village is its immediate vulnerability there to enemy armour. MBTs benefit from mobility, durability and firepower. Removing any one of these aspects makes the asset vulnerable. The tank needs clear and concise communications between crew and the CO, and the infantry squad needs two more bodies on the flag. All you have by combining the two is a weakened tank and a weakened infantry presence.

I also believe that in some maps like Qin Ling the use of an engineer on board the tank is vital as both a machine gunner and repair person. Too many times have I seen tanks that needed repair be ignored by engineers who would walk right by them.

In my experience as a tank operator on Quinling, it is much more effective to have dedicated external repair support in the form of an engineer squad than to have a third mounted on the tank. A driver switching onto the .50 and staying down causes the tank's engine/powerplant to shut down enabling the tracking of hostile sound contacts. In the battleship hide-and-seek of tank warfare in PR (since modern militaries apparently lack UAV, GPS and intel satellite capabilities) this sound tracking is integral to getting the drop on unsuspecting hostile armour. At the same time, it's possible for this to be obtained by the driver/engineer dismounting, but the added vulnerability of being right outside the vehicle as opposed to ducked down in the turret is an unnecessary complication

The overall commander should have control yes, but squad leaders should be able to assist in their own part directing the local war. The commander does not have eyes everywhere so thus must rely on the local command to ascertain and relegate the situation as it happens.

One of the greatest problems of command is that of engagement level management. It is the commanders task to position his forces. It is the commanders task to define an area of engagement (though this is done in part, in coordination with an enemy commander) and may or may not be plausible (see: Fighting an Insurgency). This means that while the flow of the battle is dictated by the troops, its initiation must be conducted on the CO's terms. Armoured assets can be more precisely positioned by someone with the maximum amount of information than they ever can by by an SL who lacks knowledge of what is over the next ridgelines. I suppose in the above you're also making inferences about the perceived competence of the commander (in 'he does not have eyes everywhere.') In reality, units shouldn't be advancing without his approval, though they may certainly take the initiative to do so without his direction. Being in a position to take the 'village' point, is something that should be relayed by an SL to command. Who will then give a 'negative' or an 'affirmative' based on his knowledge of what is happening elsewhere. However, the decision to commit an armored asset to cover an infantry advance or to protect its flank, must be made by the commander as it is his responsibility through the course of the battle to be tracking the location of enemy armour/antiarmour capabilities. Contrary to popular belief, tanks should not be engaging each other at all costs (unless you favour the idea of a crushing defeat or mass armoured attrition on both sides) See: Al Kufrah. Rather, the tanks should be offering fire support and withdrawing/avoiding from engagement with hostile armour until such time as neutralization of the hostile armour target (through positioning of assets by the commander, be they spotter-teams, anti-armour teams or simply -more- tanks than the enemy has in a given area) is assured.

I do believe though that a 2 man sniper squad made up of a sniper and the socom kits can be devastating if used by a team that can keep out of sight and alive to accomplish their mission objectives.

That is if noobie McVasiliPwnzorz III hasn't already grabbed the sniper/marksman/specops kit 'cuz I kin kill a lot with dose kits'.
:5

Totally....

I jumped on the forums to try and find out just what the heck is wrong with my steam account -- which refuses to launch the original Left 4 Dead anymore. No luck yet -- might as well engage in some shameless self promotion and try to connect with like-minded folk while I'm here.

My friend and I are indie filmmakers/screenwriters, and we decided to release the first part of our feature length L4D script online for L4D/action-horror fans to read.

We are in love with the first Left 4 Dead, so much in fact that we spent two bloody years formulating this thing:

Left 4 Dead - Movie Script

Facebook Page

I know everyone is rightfully busy fantasizing about Left 4 Dead 3, but would any of you be interested in a film version? Do we have any filmmakers or action/horror enthusiasts in the house?

We're hoping that if enough people like our work, Valve or someone would consider the possibility of a movie -- and not some half-baked, slapped together one but one the longtime fans and new fans can dig. A witty, gory, 80s-esque action/horror movie for the ages.

Thoughts? Ideas of your own? Hateful comments?